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In the days immediately following the D-Day landings of 6 June 1944, Canadian and British 
forces withstood the primary attempt by the 
Germans to crush the Allied invasion. Struck by a 
series of savage assaults by three Panzer divisions, 
the British and Canadian divisions buckled but 
did not break. The location and nature of these 
attacks were anticipated by Overlord planners. 
With Caen securely in British hands by the end 
of D-Day (it was hoped), only the broad, flat 
plains west of Caen offered the Germans the 
opportunity for a hard-hitting armoured thrust 
to the sea. Much of this key terrain was assigned 
to 3rd Canadian Infantry Division which was 
to establish brigade fortresses at the southern 
ends of the two key plains, support them with 
an exceptional number of artillery pieces, and 
destroy the German counterattack when it came. 
This is precisely what happened. In particular, 
the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade fortress astride 
the Caen-Bayeux road and rail line at Bretteville-
l’Orgueilleuse, Norrey-en-Bessin and Putot-en-
Bessin withstood everything thrown at it between 
8 and 10 June. Historians have focussed on the 
role of Canadian infantry battalions during this 
battle, and rightly so. British historian Michael 
Reynolds described the Regina Rifle Regiment’s 
defence of Bretteville as “one of the finest small 
units actions of the Second World War.”1 But the 
Reginas could not have succeeded without the 
exceptionally powerful artillery support provided 
by Overlord planners, and in particular without 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. “Freddy” Le P. T. Clifford 
and the gunners of 13th Field Regiment, Royal 
Canadian Artilley (RCA).
 Third Canadian Division was allotted more 
than double its normal artillery for the beachhead 
battles, a fact which says a great deal about 
what the Allies believed was going to happen 
west of Caen. In addition to its own divisional 
field regiments – 12th, 13th and 14th RCA – the 
Canadians had three more field regiments and a 
medium regiment temporarily assigned from 2nd 
and 4th Army Groups, Royal Artillery (AGRA), 
and two batteries of 95 mm self-propelled 
(SP) guns. Among the additions was 19th 
RCA, assigned from First Canadian Army and 
nominally attached to 4th AGRA, which landed 
on D-Day, and two British regiments of towed 
25-pounders which were to join within days: 6th 
Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (RA) from 4th 
AGRA was to land on D+2, followed by the 191st 
RA, lately of 2nd Canadian AGRA, on D+3. Thus, 
by D+3 the number of field regiments deployed 
behind the Canadian was to be six – 144 guns 
instead of the normal 72 for an infantry division. 
In addition, by D+2 the eighteen 4.5-inch guns of 
the 79th Medium Regiment, RA, from 4th AGRA 
were to be added, as were two batteries of the 2nd 
Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment (2 
RMAS) equipped with 95 mm howitzers mounted 
in Centaur tanks. The other division of the 1st 
British Corps to land on D-Day, 3rd British 
Infantry, was not as heavily reinforced. It landed 
with its own three regiments (converted to SPs) 
and added two field regiments on D+1.2
 To handle all this, the Commander, Royal 
Artillery (CRA) of the Canadian division, Brigadier 
P.A.S. Todd, RCA, organized his guns into two 
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6“Field Artillery Groups” - the 14th composed of 
14th and 19th RCA along with 191st and 79th 
RA to be deployed around Authie-Buron in gun 
area “Dorothy.” This group was to support the 9th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade fortress planned for 
the Carpiquet area. The 12th Group, composed 
of 12th and 13th RCA and 6th RA, deployed in 
gun area “Nora” behind 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade fortress at Bretteville and Putot. These 
powerful groups were to be protected by the 32 
howitzers of 3rd and 4th Batteries of 2 RMAS3 in 
a counter-mortar role, and screened by the 3rd 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, and protected against 
tank assault from the west by two batteries of 
17-pounder guns from 1st British Corps’ 62nd 
Anti-Tank Regiment. (See map above.)
 All of the field regiments landed by the 
Anglo-Canadians on D-Day – 240 guns – were 
self-propelled (SP). The majority (168) were 
American-built M7 Priests with 105 mm guns, 
while the rest were Canadian-built Sexton SPs 
with 25-pounder guns.4 Published sources are 
remarkably silent on precisely why the Anglo-
Canadian assault artillery was converted to SP 
for the Operation Overlord.5 Canadian Military 
Headquarters Report No.141 says simply that 
the Canadians followed British practice for 
assault landings in which the ability to fire from 
landing craft and to land with the gun pointing 
at the enemy was considered important.6 But 
SPs also provided mobility and protection from 
small arms fire and shell fragments (although not 
from airbursts and the danger of mortar rounds 
landing directly in the gun bay). It also meant that 
the guns could deploy quickly in a fluid battle 
without the need to dig-in.7 In addition, each SP 
regiment fielded 13 Sherman tanks to serve as 
command posts, observation posts (OPs), and to 
carry officers and others around the battlefield. 
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7These additional tanks meant that there was 
virtually another entire regiment of Shermans 
(52) in the Canadian beachhead beyond those 
in the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.8 The 
conversion of all the Anglo-Canadian assault 
artillery from towed guns to SP is further proof 
that a major Panzer assault was expected during 
the beachhead battles. 
  All four Canadian field regiments which 
landed on D-Day were equipped with the M7 
Priest and its 105 mm gun-howitzer drawn from 
American stocks. The 105 mm threw a larger 
shell than the standard 25-pounder of British 
Commonwealth artillery, and had a slightly 
shorter range. The mainstay 105 mm high 
explosive M1 shell weighed 33 pounds, with a 
bursting charge of nearly five pounds of TNT. The 
M48 PD (point detonating) fuse provided either 
a “super-quick” detonation or up to 0.15 second 
delay, while the M54 fuse permitted airburst or 
“Super Quick” settings. Alternate munitions for 
the 105 mm gun in the summer of 1944 included 
the M60 WP (white phosphorous) smoke round 
with the M57 fuse, which also proved useful for 
starting fires, and the M67 HEAT (high explosive, 
anti-tank) “fixed” round for direct fire at tanks. All 
ammunition was delivered in two-round 120-lb 
cases. M1 and M60 cases contained the projectile, 
the brass casing, seven-bag charge system and 
appropriate fuses, allowing the gunners to put 
the appropriate charge into each round for the 
program being fired. Charge-seven gave the M1 
round a maximum range of 12,500 yards, but 
practical ranges for direct support of infantry 
were much less. The 105 mm gun’s maximum 
range was about 1,500 yards shorter than the 
25-pounder field gun. This limitation would have 
serious consequences for 9th Brigade on D+1 
as it advanced to Carpiquet. However, the 7th 
Brigade battle of 7-10 June 1944 was not affected 
by the 105 mm gun’s shorter range.9 
 The regiments landing on D-Day followed the 
standard organization of British Commonwealth 
artillery. The 13th RCA was composed of three 
eight-gun batteries (the 22nd, 44th and 78th - all 
militia units from Alberta), each in turn divided 
into two four-gun troops – giving the regiment 
six troops, designated A to F.10 Normally, a field 
regiment supported an infantry brigade, with 
batteries assigned to provide fire support for 
each of the brigade’s three battalions. During 
a battle, the artillery regiment’s commanding 
officer served at brigade HQ and co-ordinated 
fire support from all guns within range – not 
just his own regiment. The regiment’s second-
in-command ran the regimental HQ in the rear. 
Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) and their 
parties operated with battalion headquarters, 
while over a dozen regimental officers were 
attached to neighbouring units to help co-
ordinate artillery across the front. The situation 
in the beachhead battles was rather different.
 It is important to observe that a field regiment 
was both a discrete combat unit and the tentacles 
of the artillery apparatus of the army in the field 
– division, corps, army and army group. The 
regiment provided immediate on-call support to 
its brigade at the front, but artillery regiments 
remained part of the whole “regiment” of Royal 
An M7 Priest self-propelled gun ﬁring on targets shortly after D-Day.
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9Artillery, with access to every gun in theatre 
through a dedicated artillery communications 
net. The FOO, his battery and regiment, therefore, 
served as the conduit through which forward 
infantry units could access fire support on a 
vast scale. This is what ultimately made the 
artillery fire of British Commonwealth armies so 
devastating. It was possible for any FOO or even 
a “gunner” – an artillery private – to deliver the 
fire of everything from his own battery to that of 
all guns of the Corps onto a single grid reference 
in a matter of minutes. Under the British system 
you fired first and asked questions later.11 It 
was this very powerful system, deployed on an 
exceptional scale behind 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division, that was intended to and actually did 
crush the anticipated German Panzer assault on 
the beachhead in the days after 6 June 1944.
 Mobility and armour allowed the Canadian 
artillery of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division to get 
ashore largely unscathed on D-Day: only six of its 
96 M7s were lost. Three were destroyed when a 
mortar bomb landed inside a Priest of “A” Troop, 
19th RCA while the vehicles were still on their 
landing craft, and three M7s of 14th RCA were 
destroyed just south of Bernières-sur-Mer by 
anti-tank fire (see account by Wesley Alkenbrack 
starting on page 65). All of the guns of the 12th 
and 13th got ashore safely. The heaviest losses in 
artillery assigned to the Canadians were suffered 
by 2 RMAS. It appears that only 22 of their 32 
Centaur SPs got safely ashore on D-Day. Five were 
lost at sea or once ashore, and the remainder 
did not land on D-Day. Nonetheless, 2 RMAS 
Centaurs were the first SPs ashore and provided 
crucial early fire support to Canadian infantry.12 
The mediums of 79th RA arrived on schedule on 
D+2, but neither of the towed British 25-pounder 
field regiments got into action before 11 June. 
 Despite these shortfalls in the planned 
allocation, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division still 
had an exceptional amount of attached fire 
support – ninety 105 mm guns available on 7 
June 1944, plus sixteen 4.5-inch mediums by the 
next day. The contrast with American practice and 
experience on D-Day could not be sharper. The 
twelve 105 mm guns of the 111th FA Battalion, 
for example, supporting the 116th Regiment of 
A Royal Marine Centaur in Courseulles, late on 6 June, still sporting its wading equipment.  Eight of these SP howitzers 
from “S” and “T” Troops, 2 RMAS, were assigned to help the Reginas with indirect ﬁre controlled by FOOs from 13th 
RCA.  “S” Troop appears to have landed only two guns, while “T” Troop had three of its four SPs disabled by track 
damage on the beach.  Nonetheless, Centaur ﬁre - even on a small scale and often in an assault gun role ﬁring direct 
- was crucial to the clearing of Courseulles, and other strongpoints along Juno beach, on D-Day.
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10
the 29th Division at Omaha Beach were borne 
in DUKWs. Once ashore, the guns were to be 
lifted out of the DUKW and deployed as regular 
towed artillery. Badly overloaded and launched 
more than six hours before their scheduled 
touch-down on the beach, most of the 111th FA’s 
DUKWs foundered in the heavy sea. Of the four 
to reach shore, three were promptly destroyed by 
German fire, leaving the equivalent of a British 
Commonwealth brigade with only one dedicated 
105 mm gun. In the end, US 29th Division landed 
only 29 guns from four different battalions on 
D-Day. Had the same fate befallen the Canadian 
guns on D-Day as those of the US 29th Division, 
the Anglo-Canadian beachhead would have been 
destroyed by the German counterattacks.13 
 The only serious losses to 13th RCA on D-
Day were in personnel. Of the five officers to 
land at Courseulles-sur-Mer with the Reginas 
in the assault wave, only one survived 6 June 
intact. Each Regina company was supported by 
a FOO “walking party” of a captain, his “Able” 
– a FOO’s assistant – and a signaller carrying 
an 18 set. The 13th RCA’s second-in-command, 
Major G.F. Rainnie, and a small party landed 
alongside the Regina’s headquarters, while the 
regiment’s recce party landed dispersed among 
the craft carrying the Regina’s reserve companies. 
Of the FOOs, Captain W.M. Dirks drowned when 
his assault craft struck a mine and sank. His 
signaller swam ashore and his Able was picked 
up by the navy and taken back to England. 
Captain J. Else was wounded crossing the beach 
and his Able, Gunner J.F. Robinson, was killed. 
Else carried on, supporting the Regina’s battle 
through Courseulles, before being struck again 
and evacuated. That left Else’s signaller, Gunner 
J. Holtzman, to carry on, which he did, calling 
down fire from two Centaurs of “S” Troop, 2 
RMAS, on a beach front blockhouse that was 
delaying the Reginas in Courseulles. Holtzman 
earned the Military Medal for his efforts. Later 
that evening Captain A.F. Wrenshall was wounded 
and evacuated. The only FOO with the Reginas 
to make it through D-Day was Captain W.J.G. 
Steele. Major G.F. Rainnie and his whole party 
of a corporal and two gunners were killed when 
they either detonated a mine or were struck by a 
shell. And Major J.D. Young, commanding officer 
of 22nd Battery and also the Unit Deployment 
Officer responsible for getting the guns into 
action, and his signaller were killed by a shell 
which struck their landing craft. Later in the 
day Lieutenant J.M. Doohan was hit by several 
bullets and had to be evacuated (see sidebar). 
In all, seven officers of 13th RCA were killed 
or wounded on D-Day, and it might well have 
been worse since “D” Company of the Reginas, 
with whom some of the recce party landed, lost 
about half its strength before ever getting ashore. 
Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford and the 
regimental headquarters landed unscathed at 
Nan Green at H+30, and two other FOO parties 
and Major R.K. Mackenzie came ashore safely 
alongside the Canadian Scottish Regiment 
(CSR).14
 Although 13th RCA’s personnel casualties 
on D-Day were small when compared to those of 
Lieutenant James Montgomery Doohan, born in 
Vancouver, BC, was a gun position ofﬁcer with 13th 
Field Regiment on 6 June 1944. Late on D-Day, 
Lieutenant Doohan was returning from a patrol 
when he was hit by machine gun ﬁre (possibly from 
a Canadian sentry). Doohan was hit by six bullets, 
four in his leg, one on his right hand (which required 
the amputation of his middle ﬁnger), and one in his 
chest which was deﬂected by his silver cigarette 
case. These wounds effectively ended Doohan’s 
war. He was evacuated to England where, upon his 
rehabilitation, he volunteered to be an air observation 
pilot. After earning his wings, he was posted to 666 
Air Observation Post Squadron, RCAF in Holland 
in the closing days of the war. Following the war, 
Doohan returned to Canada where he trained as 
an actor. He is best known today for his role as 
Montgomery Scott (“Scotty”), Chief Engineer of the 
USS Enterprise, on Star Trek.
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the infantry they supported, Major R. Mackenzie 
recalled that they caused significant disruption to 
the regiment for the first day or so.15 Major Young, 
for example, had the unique task of bringing the 
batteries and troops together as a unit amid the 
chaos. Whether his death contributed to the delay 
in getting the regiment into action is unclear. 
Major J.D. Baird assumed the job and the task 
of second in command of the regiment.16 With 
officers dispersed across the front in liaison and 
FOO roles (Mackenzie himself was soon attached 
to 8th Brigade, and 13th RCA FOOs remained 
with the CSR), it took some time to identify and 
fill the gaps in command and control. 
 A crowded beach on D-Day was probably why 
the guns of 13th RCA did not get ashore until 
the afternoon of 6 June (12th RCA came ashore 
in the morning and fired from the beach). The 
regiment was fully assembled by 1800 hours, 
when it deployed just north of Banville in gun 
area “Mary” after running a “gauntlet” of bombs 
from the Luftwaffe. The air attacks continued 
throughout the first night ashore, which the 
regimental history described as “a nightmare 
with the German planes bombing and strafing 
everywhere.”17 The lack of solid front lines also 
occasioned much digging of slit trenches and 
dodging of machine gun and sniper fire. In fact, 
one of the characteristics of the gunner’s battle 
for the next week was the fluidity of the front 
and the ever present – and very real – danger 
of a direct attack on the gun positions. It says 
a great deal about the nature of the early battle 
for the beachhead to observe that 49 of the 
167 casualties suffered by 13th RCA during 
the Northwest Europe campaign occurred 
between 6 and 12 June – including all the officer 
fatalities.
 The Canadians did not capture their D-Day 
objectives astride the Caen-Bayeux highway on 
6 June 1944, reaching only their intermediary 
objective before stopping for the night. The next 
day the advance was renewed in the hopes that 
they could reach their fortress positions before 
the Panzers arrived. In the case of 9th Brigade 
that hope was dashed. Caen had not fallen to the 
British on D-Day as planned and the brigade’s 
left flank was wide open. Consequently, the 
Gunner W.G. Magee stands guard over his M7 Priest self-propelled
gun while his comrades rest after a long day, 6 June 1944.
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vanguard of the brigade was ambushed from that 
direction at about 1300 hours by two battalions 
and about 40 Mk IV tanks of the12th SS Hitler 
Youth Panzer Division. Two North Nova Scotia 
Highlander companies, the Shermans of the 
Sherbooke Fusiliers and their supporting units 
which formed the vanguard fought around Authie 
and Buron all afternoon, and did so without 
artillery support. At the time the 12th SS struck, 
the regiment covering the 9th Brigade vanguard, 
14th RCA, was out of range. It had been forced 
to withdraw from its assigned gun position 
near la Mare (northwest of Anguerny) because 
of machine gun and mortar fire from the radar 
station at Douvres – which was being attacked by 
the North Shore Regiment supported by the other 
field regiment of the 14th Group, 19th RCA. The 
vanguard’s other support, the nine 6-inch guns 
of the British cruiser HMS Belfast, could not be 
contacted because the radio link failed. 
  The initial attack on 9th Brigade would 
have been shattered had its supporting artillery 
been on line at 1300 hours. It remains one of 
the great unsolved mysteries of the early days in 
Normandy, however, why the North Novas had to 
wait over four hours to receive artillery support. 
The only notation in the 14th RCA war diary 
about this is that when the attack started their 
FOOs withdrew to high ground around Buron 
to get better observation of the battlefield. This 
is not sufficient to explain why three batteries of 
self-propelled guns remained silent until 1800 
hours when, as both the 14th’s war diary and 
the North Nova’s history records, they finally 
fired their first barrages. Nor does it explain why 
regiments of the 12th Field Group, which were 
nearing Bray in the late afternoon, were not called 
upon to provide support . 
 Coordination of fire support was the task of 
the divisional artillery HQ, which according to its 
War Diary “landed with little difficulty” around 
noon on 6 June and established itself in an 
orchard near Beny-sur-Mer “with considerable 
confusion.” The war diary’s entry for 7 June is 
short, observing that “The battle is progressing 
very favourably.” Problems on the 9th Brigade 
front on 7 June do not make an appearance 
in the CRA’s war diary until the next day, in a 
cryptic note that the brigade had “run into some 
strong points.” In short, the CRA’s war diary 
suggests that the division artillery HQ took no 
role in the battle on D+1.18 If so, this may not be 
simply a failure in command. The section of the 
operational order for the divisional artillery titled 
“The Consolidation of the Divisional Covering 
Position” specified that DF [defensive fire] and 
DF (SOS) [emergency DF] tasks would be “issued 
by HQ RCA after co-ordination of demands on 
re-organization.” Since the division had not yet 
consolidated on its covering position astride the 
Caen-Bayeux highway, it is possible that the CRA 
had not yet assumed full control of his guns. This 
may also explain why no fire support was received 
by the North Novas from 12th Field Group as 
it moved forward on the other side of the Mue 
River.
 Whatever the reason,19 by late afternoon on 
D+1 the two companies of North Novas fighting 
around Authie were over-run, as elements of 
two German battalions pushed through Buron 
and onto the open ground to the north. There 
the first shells of Canadian artillery fire finally 
landed. The surviving Novas fighting north of 
Buron wanted to “stand and cheer!” at the sight 
of the 105 mm shells exploding among the Hitler 
Youth. According to Will Bird, Canadian gunners 
“routed the Germans,” and the young Nazis were 
hounded all the way back to Authie by tanks, 
“dying in groups all over the field.”20 
 In the event, 9th Brigade’s fortress was 
established at Villons-les-Buissons, north of 
Buron, on easily defended ground. This proved 
to be much less of a set-back for the Canadians 
than historians have claimed, since a brigade 
fortress at Carpiquet would have been untenable 
without the simultaneous capture of Caen by the 
British. Moreover, the position at Villons-les-
Buissons denied the Germans use of the plain 
east of the Mue River for their Panzer thrust to 
the sea. In short, the mission of the division 
was accomplished even if the details of the plan 
were not - the expected Panzer assault had been 
blunted and stopped. This meant, however, that 
gun area “Dorothy” planned for the open ground 
west of Authie was lost and 14th Field Group RCA 
had to be squeezed into areas already designated 
for other activities. 
 The 7th Brigade was more fortunate on 
D+1. Its advance to the brigade fortress area 
astride the Caen-Bayeux highway was essentially 
uncontested, and was well covered by guns of 
the 12th Field Group. In the case of 13th RCA, 
new FOOs were quickly found for the Reginas: 
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Lieutenant T.J. O’Brennan for “B” 
Company, Lieutenant R.J. Macdonald 
for “D” Company and Captain Steele 
for “C.” By D+1 these were no 
longer “walking parties” of three, but 
“armoured” OPs of five men mounted 
in a Sherman tank (the FOO, his Able, 
his signaller and two tank crewmen). 
These were easily able to move 
forward as 7th Brigade advanced. No 
FOO was attached to “A” Company 
of the Reginas, presumably because 
Clifford himself was in their midst at 
the battalion HQ. 
 On D+1 13th RCA moved 
forward in two bounds. The first 
was a deployment half way between 
Pierrepont and Fontaine-Henry, to 
cover the brigade’s final advance on 
their objective. They remained there 
until 1600 hours, when the advance to gun area 
“Nora,” a grid square around the hamlet of Bray, 
began. The position was a good one. Barely a 
mile north of Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, Bray is 
nestled into a little flat re-entrant west of the 
Mue River, just below the 50-metre contour line. 
On its western side rises the broad flat plain 
that runs north from Bretteville to the sea. The 
position is open to Bretteville across flat fields 
to the south, but sheltered from the Mue River 
a 1000 metres to the east by a broad flat crest 
providing excellent fields of fire. The regiment 
deployed south of Bray, with 22nd and 44th 
Batteries forward, both commanding open 
ground, 78th Battery tucked in behind them, 
and the RHQ in the village. From there it was 
possible for the 13th to engage targets south as 
far as Esquay across the Odon River southwest 
of Caen, east nearly to the Orne River crossings 
at Benouville (Pegasus Bridge), and west to within 
a few kilometres of Bayeux. The 13th RCA’s war 
diary observed that “the gun posn at BRAY was 
most satisfactory and defensively ideal with good 
tk killing ground forward.” This changed when 
12th RCA deployed in the open ground directly 
in front of 22nd and 78th Batteries resulting in 
“a dangerously cramped Gp posn without any 
advantage of perimeter fire!”21 
 But that was not the worst of it. The 
wooded valley of the Mue River to the east was 
a completely open flank. A mounted patrol 
from both regiments on the afternoon of 7 June 
probed as far as Rots where they found the 
chateau occupied and recorded the positions 
of a number of active 88 mm batteries – which 
they observed firing just a few kilometres from 
the gun positions at Bray. A company of the CSR 
was soon deployed to screen the flank from 
roughly le Hamel to opposite Rosel, but from 
there, through Cairon to les Buissons the front 
remained open. The artillery regiments provided 
their own local defence and OPs on the east flank 
to deal with infiltrations. As it turned out, the gun 
positions were under constant fire from the time 
they deployed until they moved to more secure 
locations on 9 June. Mortars, machine gun fire, 
snipers and 88 mm air burst were constant 
dangers – as were tanks from time to time. The 
War Diary of 2 RMAS records that some Centaurs 
were deployed on 7 June with the Field Groups, 
but there is no record of their activity before 9 
June.
  Although it was normal practice for a field 
artillery regiment to operate in support of a 
brigade, the situation in these early beachhead 
Some of the 13th RCA men who helped 
to secure the 7th Brigade fortress: 
Gunners Len Forbes, Herb Guard, Don 
Germscheid and Frank Curlis pose for the 
photographer, 25 June 1944.
LAC PA 132923
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battles was different. The whole of 13th RCA was 
dedicated to the support of one infantry battalion, 
the Regina Rifles, while the 12th RCA worked 
with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles holding Putot. As 
a result, Lieutenant-Colonel Freddie Clifford, the 
diminutive, wiry and tough professional gunner 
who commanded 13th RCA, and a small group 
of personnel settled in with Lieutenant-Colonel 
F.M. Matheson at the Regina’s HQ, a small 
chateau beside the church in the eastern end of 
Bretteville. “A” Company of the battalion was also 
deployed in the heart of the village. FOO parties 
were assigned to companies in forward positions: 
Captain W.J.G. Steele with “C” Company in 
Norrey, Lieutenant T.J. O’Brennan with “B” 
Company in the Mue River valley near Rots, and 
Lieutenant R.J. Macdonald with what remained 
of “D” Company near la Villeneuve. In these 
static roles, the Sherman OP tank was usually 
established in an overwatch position, while the 
FOO, his Able and signaller went forward to a 
good vantage point with a telephone line, leaving 
the other signaller in the tank to act as the radio 
link.
 Although the guns, FOOs and HQ party were 
all in basically static positions, their dispersal 
and the general work of the artillery required 
many men of the 13th RCA to be in constant 
motion. Ammunition needed to be brought 
forward from the beach, alternate gun positions 
had to be surveyed in case they were forced 
to move (about 30 were surveyed during the 
first week ashore), land lines laid to FOOs and 
various HQs had to be maintained, reliefs and 
meals provided for those serving forward, liaison 
maintained with neighbouring formations, and 
dispatches and personnel moved between HQs 
at all levels. The situation was made even worse 
because 7th Brigade occupied a narrow and 
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deep salient, with enemy forces on both flanks. 
As the regimental history observed, “A few wrong 
turns, while travelling to the forward positions, 
would quickly take the unfortunate map reader 
into enemy territory.”22 Harold Merrick, a gunner 
with the 22nd Battery, recalled being frightened of 
losing his way when detailed to drive two battery 
officers forward to the Regina’s HQ early one 
morning. He had to navigate the short distance 
in the dark with one of the officers reading a 
map with a penlight. They took one wrong turn 
but got there eventually. The return trip in the 
dawn light was perhaps even more harrowing, 
since the scenes of battle littered the road.23 On 
at least one occasion, signalmen from 13th RCA 
were nearly in Carpiquet before being called 
back. Others were not so fortunate. Late on 7 
June Bombardier C.A. McDonald, signal NCO 
of Fox Troop, was killed by enemy infantry while 
returning from the OP in Putot.
 While 9th Brigade fought a fierce battle 
just a few kilometres away, D+1 was a day of 
preparation for 7th Brigade. For the artillery this 
meant organizing fire plans in co-operation with 
the Reginas and the brigade HQ. The intelligence 
log of the 13th RCA records some 33 DF, SOS and 
Mike targets prepared on 7 June. Defensive Fire 
tasks, which included enemy forming-up areas, 
lines of communications, and likely approach 
routes, were selected by battalion and brigade 
staffs in consultation with the gunners. Most of 
these in the 7th Brigade battle plan fell into two 
general categories: the western approaches to 
the brigade fortress in the open ground west and 
southwest of Putot, and targets south of Norrey, 
including the most likely enemy concentration 
and approach routes around Cheux, St. Manvieu 
and Marcelet (see map on page 14). These proved 
to be very sound judgements. SOS fire tasks, to 
be brought down when the defending infantry 
were engaged, were arranged with the rifle 
companies to cover forward defence lines and 
areas immediately to the front which could not 
be swept by infantry weapons.24 Other work went 
on in battery positions, where ammunition and 
perimeter defences were prepared. In Bretteville 
itself, the gunners attached to the Regina’s HQ 
made themselves useful. Gunner W.C. Milner, a 
qualified machine gunner, recalled spending at 
least some time on 7 June attaching signal wire to 
anti-tank mines and laying these out so they could 
be drawn across the road in front of tanks.
 Attacks on the 7th Brigade fortress started in 
earnest in the early hours of 8 June, when three 
companies of the 1st Battalion, 26th SS Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment (I/26th), moved north from 
St. Manvieu to push the Reginas out of Norrey and 
Bretteville. This was the opening of an attempt 
to clear the Canadians off the Germans’ planned 
start-line (the Caen-Bayeux highway) for a major 
panzer thrust to the sea. The I/26th’s third 
company moved straight on Norrey under the 
cover of night, driving in the advanced positions 
of the Regina’s “C” Company before the attack 
was crushed by artillery fire, forcing the Hitler 
Youth to dig in. They had, of course, walked into 
the pre-arranged DF tasks laid on by the FOO in 
Norrey, Captain Steele. Meanwhile, the I/26th’s 
first company tried to slip around Norrey to the 
east where they, too, were stopped by artillery fire. 
This company of I/26th eventually occupied the 
Mue Valley as far as Rots – putting a major enemy 
combat unit directly opposite the gun positions 
at Bray for the first time. The second company 
of I/26th attacked west of Norrey but stopped at 
Cardonville Farm south of the rail line when the 
other attacks faltered. 
 The Regina’s war diary records this first 
attack by I/26th as minor, presumably because 
very little of it was seen or felt in the company 
positions. However, it was not a minor attack - 
it simply was checked by pre-arranged artillery 
fire. As the history of the 12th SS records, 
“The positions of the whole Battalion [I/26th] 
were covered with brisk artillery and mortar 
fire throughout the day. It slowed any kind of 
movement.”25 The intelligence log of 13th RCA 
records that the regiment fired 976 rounds 
between 1800 hours on 7 June and 0600 hours 
the next day. The regimental history describes 
a “curtain of fire” securing the Regina’s “C” 
Company position at Norrey.26 When asked about 
this many years later, Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford 
described the idea of a curtain as “bullshit!”27 The 
perimeter was maintained by a series of DF and 
Mike (regimental) shoots. One concentration on 
the road leading southeast from Norrey at 0500 
hours on 8 June was fired at “scale 5” from both 
regiments at Bray - 240 shells on a single grid 
reference in a few short minutes. Two other Mike 
targets were fired in that area over the next fews 
hours.
 While the I/26th was pounded by fire, the 
main assault of 8 June took place to the west 
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by the 2nd Battalion, 26th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment (II/26th) at Putot and involved intense 
action on the part of everyone including the 
gunners. The 13th’s war diary and regimental 
history recorded few details, describing the day 
simply as one of constant action in all directions. 
Many Mike and Uncle (division scale) targets were 
fired over an arc of approximately 240 degrees 
on 8 June. The regiment was nearly firing in a 
circle, requiring the use of two plotting boards.28 
The attack by the panzer grenadiers of II/26th 
on Putot, well supported by their own artillery 
and with several assault guns in direct support, 
over-ran the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. During that 
battle Lance-Bombardier E. Schauer of 13th 
RCA was awarded the Croix de Guerre for using 
the main armament of his OP tank to silence 
enemy machine guns firing at his FOO, which 
allowed effective fire to be called down in the area. 
The Canadian Scottish Regiment, in reserve at 
Secqueville, was tasked to retake Putot supported 
by the fire of five field regiments.29 Artillery kept 
German infantry in the village down, isolated 
the battlefield with a smoke barrage, walked the 
Can Scots in with a creeping barrage, and then 
maintained defensive fire to the south and west 
until the position was consolidated. Putot was 
not lost again.
 These first attacks on 7th Brigade forced 
a consolidation of infantry positions which 
made the fortress more secure but exposed its 
supporting artillery. The CSR company which 
had been guarding the brigade’s eastern flank 
along the Mue River rejoined its battalion on the 
western flank. The Reginas also abandoned the 
valley of the Mue River. “B” Company moved from 
near Rots to the eastern end of Bretteville, and 
“D” Company moved from its exposed position 
near la Villeneuve to the farm at Cardonville, just 
north of where the second company of I/26 was 
stalled. The occupation of Cardonville secured 
the southwestern entrance into Bretteville and 
guarded the back of Norrey. Meanwhile, three 
troops of 2 RMAS Centaurs still fighting alongside 
the Royal Marines in the coastal area between 3rd 
Canadian and 3rd British Divisions were recalled 
to Beny in preparation for redeployment to their 
countermortar role around the 12 and 14th Field 
Groups.30
 This withdrawal into a tight perimeter 
around Bretteville may account for one of the 
most bizarre incidents of the battle. Historians 
have recounted the story, often believed to be 
apocryphal, of the German staff officer who drove 
into Bretteville, stopped his Kubelwagon in front 
of the Reginas HQ, and stepped out of the vehicle 
only to receive a PIAT anti-tank projectile in the 
chest for his arrogance. Michael Reynolds places 
the incident at 0030 hours on the morning of 
9 June, and then notes that the incident was 
struck-out of the Regina’s war diary. This may be 
because, as Clifford recalled the incident (which 
he witnessed), it happened in broad daylight at 
noon on 8 June.31
 Late on 8 June the second major attack 
on Bretteville was launched from the east. 
This consisted of two companies of the 12th 
SS Panzer Regiment’s 1st Panzer Battalion (I. 
Panzerabteilung ) (about 30 Panther tanks), a 
company of motorcycle infantry from the division 
reconnaissance regiment, and a battery of self-
propelled guns. The Canadians were well aware 
of the concentration of tanks to the east, and 
“B” Company’s FOO, Lieutenant O’Brennan, 
had called down fire on them during the day. 
The German Kampfgruppe was drawn together 
by Standartenfuhrer Kurt Meyer, commander of 
the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, who 
led the attack on a motorcycle. It was timed for 
dusk (about 2300 hours) to avoid interference 
from Allied aircraft. The Panthers crossed the 
bridge over the Mue at la Villeneuve, which the 
Reginas had not destroyed, and then shook open 
and moved directly towards “B” Company on 
the eastern edge of Bretteville. Although weak in 
infantry, Meyer expected the companies of the 
I/26 dug-in south of Norrey to join the attack.
 Only a handful of German infantry made 
it to the village. Most were stripped away by 
Canadian artillery, mortars and machine gun 
fire, while the 79th Medium Regiment, RA, which 
joined the battle from its positions around Thaon 
that afternoon,32 prevented the participation 
of the companies of the I/26th dug in around 
Norrey. Few of the 12th SS Panthers made it into 
Bretteville either. The 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, 
RCA, destroyed three on the outskirts, forcing 
most of the rest to withdraw and join the SP 
battery as a fire-base east of the village. The two 
Panthers audacious enough to enter Bretteville 
around midnight were destroyed by infantry. 
The story is by now a familiar one. Captain Tom 
Greenlees, the 13th RCA’s Survey Officer, was 
crouching behind the stone wall at the entrance 
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to the Regina’s HQ when the Panther that made 
it that far was disabled by a PIAT. The tank has 
been immortalized in one of the iconic photos 
of the whole Normandy campaign. “The crew 
bailed out,” Greenlees recalls, “and I somewhat 
ineffectively engaged the fleeing figures with 
a Sten gun borrowed from my survey crew 
beforehand.”33 The Panther’s ammunition 
exploded and burned all night. Greenlees was 
therefore stunned the next morning when one 
fire-blackened crewman stuck his head from the 
tank, “more dead than alive,” and was promptly 
shot by a rifleman from 50 feet. For Greenlees it 
was a stark introduction to the tragedy of war.
 Gunner W.C. Milner vividly remembered 
the chaos, the fires, the parachute flares, the 
crash of explosions and rattle of small arms fire. 
These were punctuated by the ripping sound of 
armour-piercing rounds from Panthers firing 
petulantly over the stone wall against which he 
was sheltering. At one point Milner, carrying 
a Thompson submachine-gun as part of the 
regimental HQ defence section, had a chance to 
shoot some of the very few German infantry to 
enter the village. Standing in an alleyway, with 
his back pressed hard against a building and the 
Thompson clutched to his chest,34 he watched as 
an MG 42 section raced past him in the darkness 
and clambered over the stone wall at the end 
of the lane. Just as the last boot disappeared, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford swept around the 
corner and fired a few harmless shots from his 
revolver at the fleeing Hitler Youth. Catching a 
glimpse of Gunner Milner and his Thompson, 
Clifford fired him a cold stare and a sharp, “See 
me in the morning!”, then disappeared into the 
night to find more Germans. A mild rebuke about 
duty and something about there “being a war on” 
followed in the early hours of 9 June for Gunner 
Milner.35
 “Panzer” Meyer’s attack late on 8 June spilled 
over to the gun area around Bray. All night 
12th and 13th RCA “stood-to,” with a defensive 
perimeter of small arms, Brens and PIATs. 
“Tank Alert” was signalled at 0545 hours, and 
the No.1 gun of Able Troop, 22nd Battery, 13th 
RCA, engaged a tank over open sights, with no 
apparent effect.36 The intelligence log records that 
78th Battery fired 44 rounds of M67 anti-tank 
ammunition that night. Meanwhile, 12th RCA, 
The Panther of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment destroyed by Regina sentries
outside the battalion HQ in Bretteville on the night of 8-9 June 1944.
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deployed in the open in front of the 13th, received 
a number of Reginas in their position, gave them 
ammunition, and gently urged the infantry back 
into the fray. The same regiment recounts firing 
an “Uncle” (division) target “directly in front of 
us” – which would have included the 13th. Uncle 
and Victor (all field guns in the Corps, roughly 
216 in all) targets were engaged throughout 9 
June on an arc of 180 degrees, from the front 
of 3rd British Infantry Division north of Caen 
to that of 50th Division to the west. “Each time 
we switched back to the tanks in front of us,” 
the 12th’s history recounts, “the range would 
be shorter and the appeals of the FOOs more 
desperate. When we finally stopped them the 
range was just over 1,600 yards – much too close, 
especially when we were firing 8,000 yards in the 
opposite direction!”37 
 Requests for fire support from FOOs with the 
Regina companies were constantly interrupted 
when the forward telephone lines were cut by 
tanks and shell fire. Lieutenant R.J. Macdonald, 
the FOO with “D” Company at Cardonville, 
lost his line at 2000 hours, and a line crew 
was immediately sent out to reconnect him.38 
In the event, they never did. While “A” and “B” 
Companies of the Reginas hunted tanks and 
enemy infantry in the eastern end of Bretteville, 
one company of Panthers slipped south of the 
village and took positions inside the “D” Company 
perimeter. There they waited for infantry from 
the second company of I/26 to join them from 
across the rail line to the south. Major Gordon 
Brown’s men of “D” Company were afraid to 
move lest they alert the Panthers, who were in 
fact all around them and intermingled with their 
6-pounder anti-tank guns in a small orchard. 
In the midst of all this Brown had to wake his 
FOO, who had fallen into a deep sleep after days 
without rest. The last recorded messages from 
Macdonald were logged by 13th RCA at 0445 
hours and 0450 hours, passed via 78th Battery, 
announcing that he was surrounded by tanks and 
needed “armour immediately.” Macdonald and 
his Able, Gunner J.K. Jeffrey, were later found 
dead in a Bren carrier, killed by machine gun fire 
from one of the Panthers. 
 Either because Macdonald’s line was cut, or 
because he was already dead, no fire support 
was received by “D” Company during its uneven 
fight against a company of Panthers. Once the 
Panthers moved off, the II/26th stirred to life, 
surged north over the rail line and were soon 
swirling around the Regina company “fortress” 
in the farm compound. “D” Company’s desperate 
defence of the Cardonville farm had all the 
Sergeant J.S. McGraw and 
Captain (Reverend) Graham 
Jamieson of the Reginas, at the 
crossroads near the Bretteville 
church, 15 June. The village 
remained on the frontline for 
nearly a month and the steeple, 
where Lieutenant O’Brennan 
spent much of his time as FOO for 
“B” Company on 8-10 June, has 
already been largely destroyed by 
enemy ﬁre. A week later there was 
virtually nothing left of the church 
itself. The Reginas’ HQ lay at the 
foot of the steeple, behind the 
soldiers.
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character of a last stand against overwhelming 
odds. Brown was now down to “45 men and 
two officers” and they all had machine guns “of 
one sort or another (several German).”39 Hitler 
Youth in their mottled camouflage uniforms lay 
dead and dying on the tops of walls, in windows 
and doorways. Grenades fell like rain and the 
Reginas fired like madmen, but still the teenage 
soldiers of the 12th SS came. When Brown 
eventually established radio contact with his HQ, 
barely half a kilometre away, his situation was 
grim. Lieutenant-Colonel Matheson immediately 
passed the radio handset to Clifford. Brown told 
the 13th’s CO that he believed that his FOO was 
dead, killed with many others in the orchard 
behind the farm, but wanted fire brought down 
immediately on the rail line just south of the farm 
and passed Clifford the grid reference. “Tell your 
men to stay in their trenches,” Clifford barked, 
“we’ll open fire in one minute.” While the fire 
orders were passed Brown informed Matheson 
that “D” Company could last only about 20 
minutes longer.40 He scarcely had time to make 
that report before the first shells thundered in, 
landing just beyond the southern wall of the 
factory – catching the Germans in the open. “The 
accuracy of the shelling was unbelievable,” Brown 
recalled. “We were to see so many more months of 
fighting and see and hear a lot of artillery shells 
from both sides, but nothing ever impressed 
me as much as the one at Cardonville.”41 Walter 
Keith, who joined 16 Platoon of “D” Company in 
October 1944, remembers that the platoon was 
still talking about how that barrage creased the 
top of the farm compound wall on its way to the 
enemy.42
 The final major attack on the Reginas’ position 
came at 1300 hours on 9 June. Panthers of the 
3rd Company of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment, 
supported by a few men from the 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, slipped south under the 
rail bridge at la Villeneuve and raced towards 
Norrey across a kilometre of open, slightly rising 
farmland. Infantry of the I/26th, still entrenched 
south of Norrey, were once again supposed to 
join in the attack and help drive the Reginas’ “C” 
Company from the key position in the brigade 
fortress. In their haste, the Hitler Youth’s Panthers 
soon left their own infantry behind, which was 
probably just as well given what awaited the 
German attack. After shaking out into extended 
order and briefly running parallel to the rail line, 
the Panthers turned slightly south to present 
their thick frontal armour to the anti-tank 
guns at Norrey. In doing so they exposed their 
flanks at fairly short range to a troop of newly-
arrived Shermans of the 1st Hussars. Seven 
Panthers were destroyed in a matter of minutes, 
five of them by Lieutenant G.K. Henry and his 
Sergeant J.S. McGraw and 
Captain (Reverend) Graham 
Jamieson of the Reginas, at the 
crossroads near the Bretteville 
church, 15 June. The village 
remained on the frontline for 
nearly a month and the steeple, 
where Lieutenant O’Brennan 
spent much of his time as FOO for 
“B” Company on 8-10 June, has 
already been largely destroyed by 
enemy ﬁre. A week later there was 
virtually nothing left of the church 
itself. The Reginas’ HQ lay at the 
foot of the steeple, behind the 
soldiers.
No.4 Gun of Easy Troop, 13th RCA, ﬁring at Carpiquet on 28 June from a gun position near Lasson (mis-identiﬁed in 
the original caption as 14th RCA on 20 June). Note the additional armour plating added just prior to D-Day to further 
protect the gun crew.
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Right: This composite 
air photo, taken on 6 July 
1944, shows the Reginas’ 
battleﬁeld around Bretteville-
l’Orgueilleuse and Norrey-
en-Bessin.
Below left: A closeup of 
Cardonville Farm. Note 
the numerous tank tracks 
surrounding the farm. 
Some of these would have 
been made by the 12th SS 
Panthers on the night of 8-9 
June.
Below right: An unidentiﬁed 
soldier from “D” Company 
of the Reginas dug in at 
Cardonville Farm, 10 June 
1944. The strain on his face 
from the previous days’ 
battles is evident.
Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse
Norrey-en-Bessin
Cardonville Farm
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Top: One of the seven Panthers destroyed 
between Norrey and Bretteville by the Sherman 
Fireﬂy of Lieutenant Henry and the other three 
Shermans from the 1st Hussars on 9 June. This 
photo was taken about a month after the battle 
and the damage on the tank reﬂects its use for 
target practice. 
Right: Soldiers of “D” Company, the Regina 
Riﬂes, keep watch on the surrounding ﬁelds 
from an OP in Cardonville Farm, 10 June 1944.
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Norrey-en-Bessin
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Top: One of the seven Panthers destroyed 
between Norrey and Bretteville by the Sherman 
Fireﬂy of Lieutenant Henry and the other three 
Shermans from the 1st Hussars on 9 June. This 
photo was taken about a month after the battle 
and the damage on the tank reﬂects its use for 
target practice. 
Right: Soldiers of “D” Company, the Regina 
Riﬂes, keep watch on the surrounding ﬁelds 
from an OP in Cardonville Farm, 10 June 1944.
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gunner Trooper A. Chapman in one of the most 
remarkable – and unheralded – feats of whole 
Normandy campaign.43
 The Panther attack collapsed within minutes 
following the engagement of Lieutenant Henry’s 
Shermans. The rest of the Panthers fled while 
crewmen who bailed out of the burning tanks raced 
to find shelter. The history of the 3rd Company 
of the 12th SS panzer Regiment recorded that 
“the whole sector was under concentrated enemy 
fire, some of it from ships’ guns...”44 The fire was 
probably called in by Gunner E. Barton, 13th 
RCA, who moved forward to a vantage point, 
under mortar and machine gun fire, where he 
could direct it. When the wire to his carrier was 
cut, Gunner B.J. Bohn, the signaller, “ran the 
gauntlet” back to the radio.45 Historians speculate 
about why the infantry of I/26th Regiment never 
left their trenches to support this attack. The rout 
of the Panthers may account for that, but it is 
more likely that artillery fire kept them home. 
 Although most accounts of the battle end 
with the defeat of the Panther attack on Norrey 
at noon on 9 June, 13th RCA’s records reveal 
intense activity over the next two days. On 9 
June the Regina’s “D” Company at Cardonville 
once again came under intense attack, and 
Captain A.K. Pousette, their new FOO, was forced 
to defend his OP with grenades. Lieutenant 
O’Brennan continued his outstanding work with 
“B” Company on the eastern edge of Bretteville. 
An attempt to relieve him on 9 June failed when 
Captain Steele’s Sherman was hit by tank fire 
and driven back. On 10 June O’Brennan was 
200 yards out in front of the company position, 
on the crest of the rise east of the village, when 
he was overrun by tanks and called a Mike target 
on his own position.46
 By 9 June the gun positions at Bray were 
under such serious threat that they had to be 
abandoned – 12th RCA reported duelling with 
German mortars sited in the valley of the Mue 
and airburst shells fired by 88 mm flak batteries 
at Carpiquet airfield were a constant danger. The 
situation was eased somewhat by the arrival of 
S, T, X and Z troops – 16 Centaurs – of 2 RMAS, 
which reported engaging targets from around 
Bray on 9 June.47 Meanwhile, the batteries of 
13th RCA appear to have simply moved across 
the road in the afternoon, probably just over the 
crest of the ridge west of Bray (the RHQ did not 
move) into the grid square reserved for 6th RA 
which had not yet arrived. Nonetheless, counter 
battery fire by 88s and mortars intensified during 
the day, with the 12th RCA fighting a battle 
against a group of mortars just 1,700 yards 
away.48 It finally became obvious that gun area 
Nora was untenable when an airburst over the 
22nd Battery command post killed or wounded 
most of the men in it. So 13th RCA moved again 
later on 9 June. The regimental war diary says 
to grids 9575 and 9675 while the intelligence 
log (and the regimental history) placed the new 
battery positions west of Camilly on the road 
to Secqueville. It was not until 11 June that 
Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford took his leave of the 
Regina’s HQ and 13th RCA’s war diary recorded 
a quiet day. The battle for Bretteville – and the 
larger battle of which it was a part – was over. It 
was a resounding Canadian victory.
 There is little doubt that the guns played 
a decisive role in securing the Anglo-Canadian 
bridgehead in the days immediately following D-
Day, and in defence of Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse 
in particular. By one estimate, the regiments at 
Bray fired over 1,500 rounds per gun from 7 to 
9 June 1944.49 Assuming the same rates of fire 
on 10 June, that works out to over 4,800 rounds 
fired by 13th RCA in the initial beachhead battles: 
2,400 120-pound crates of ammunition lugged 
from the beach day and night by Battery Sergeant-
Major D.MacRae and his drivers over dark and 
insecure roads. 
 The anticipated Panzer counterattacks had 
been launched against the Allied beachhead and 
they had failed to achieve anything more than local 
tactical success. It is clear that Anglo-Canadian 
artillery was a key to this victory, and its power 
profoundly impressed the Germans who faced it 
during those battles of 7-10 June 1944. Hubert 
Meyer, GSO 1 of the 12th SS, observed later 
in the Hitler Youth division’s history that their 
familiar tactics of “surprise, using mobile, fast 
infantry and Panzers even in small, numerically 
inferior Kampfgruppe, had often been practised 
and proven in Russia .... This tactic, however, 
had not resulted in the expected success here 
against a courageous and determined enemy...
who was especially strong in defence and could 
not be taken by surprise.”50 When interviewed 
in 2002 Freddie Clifford agreed. His regiment’s 
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training and the army’s doctrine 
worked superbly. In defence of 
the 7th Brigade fortress, artillery 
stripped away the enemy infantry 
or prevented them from moving, 
leaving their tanks vulnerable. “The 
Germans thought we were fucking 
Russians!” Clifford exclaimed when 
asked about the fighting around 
Bretteville. “They did stupid things 
and we killed those bastards in 
large numbers” – not the usual 
interpretation one gets from the 
literature.
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